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I want to broach what I contend are the biggest ques-
tions for historians: why do cultural changes happen? And 
why have they tended to accelerate? Underlying these 
conclusions, problems lurks another question, so funda-
mental to historians’ work that we never even ask it. Why 
does change happen at all? Progress, after all, is only an 
instance of change, or perhaps a term that attempts an 
overall characterisation of it. But it seems premature to 
question it before we have satisfied ourselves that we 
understand the bigger phenomenon of which it is a part 
or an intended description. Change is a difficult subject to 
address, because everything we say about it is observed 
from the inside, trapped by a form of uncertainty principle. 
Change grips us as we try to grasp it. Philosophers who 
attempted to explain it in antiquity –from the Upanishads 
to the Eleatics and beyond– commonly fell back on the 
counter-intuitive claim that it is illusory, because it seems 
inexplicable. A changed state of affairs, they reckoned, 
presupposes a prior state unchanged with respect to it. 
Alternatively, the solution associated with Heraclitus, that 
change is the essence of nature –that flux, if you like, is 
the default state of the universe– satisfies observation 
but, as Plato pointed out in the Theaetetus, defies logic1. 
Healing for such disputes is beyond historians’ practice. 
But it may still be worthwhile asking why change happens 
in the historian’s specific province of culture. Hitherto, we 
have taken this for granted and thought it intractable to 
or unworthy of enquiry. I believe we can no longer be so 
insouciant. Primatology and cultural zoology have given 
us new standards of comparison, which make the question 
ineluctable and even urgent.
The novelty of the disclosures of these disciplines is ap-
parent to me when I recall the chimpanzees’ tea party, 
which, like many other Londoners, I attended occasion-
ally as a child. It was a daily event at the zoo in the 
“fifties, now banned as politically incorrect and injurious 
to chimpanzees” dignity. The chimps sat at a table laden 
with teatime paraphernalia and foodstuffs, where they 
entertained the crowd by making as much mess as pos-
sible. According to one of the world’s leading experts on 
chimpanzee behaviour, they probably deliberately hammed 
up the performance for the spectators’ delectation (Waal, 
2002). We onlookers, however, thought it funny –though 
the younger of us may not have expressed it thus– because 
we thought that humans were uniquely cultural animals, 
and that chimps’ efforts to imitate our table manners 
were vitiated by a fundamental inability to understand 
what manners were. Now the joke is on us, because half 
a century of research has taught us that we are not alone 
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in possessing culture, and that chimpanzees are among a 
number of non-human cultural creatures: practitioners, 
that is, of behaviours that are socially but not practically 
functional and are neither instinctive nor advantageous in 
an evolutionary sense; rather, they are transmitted by tra-
dition and acquired by learning (Waal, 2001; Waal y Tyack, 
2003; Hurley y Nudds, 2006; Pryor y Norris, 1991; Mann, 
2000). It is now apparent, moreover, that chimpanzees 
have food-distribution practices of their own –I should not 
hesitate to call them rites– which may not be as mannered 
as those of our tea-tables but which are nonetheless of 
broadly the same ilk.
The evidence that some non-human animals have culture 
began to pile up in the early 1950s, when investigators in 
Japan observed a now famous macaque monkey instruct-
ing her tribe in her newly discovered technique of wash-
ing the dirt off sweet potatoes before eating. Subsequent 
generations learned how to do it and continue the tradi-
tion –with some modifications– to this day. Proof that the 
practice is a rite rather than a crudely useful function is 
that the monkeys will always do the washing, even if hu-
mans deliver the vegetables ready-cleaned, as if in a super-
market (Waal, 2002, 51). Since the discovery of macaque 
culture, innumerable cultural practices have been detected 
in many species of apes and monkeys and also, according 
to investigators in the field, in elephants, dolphins and 
rats. In some cases, there is evidence of cultural divergence 
among communities of a single species. In some baboon 
tribes, for instance, males practise monogamy; in oth-
ers, they have harems. Different chimpanzee communities 
have different technologies; some hunt quite intensively, 
whereas others do not (Stanford, 1998). In different places, 
orangutans play different games. Yet it remains true to say 
that cultural divergence –which is an index of the scale 
and rate of cultural change– is very small in non-human 
species, compared with the immense diversity of human 
cultures. It is remarkable that there are any cultural dif-
ferences at all between communities of particular species 
of apes and monkeys, but they oscillate within a narrow 
band. Dolphin societies and those of rats and elephants 
exhibit the same or scarcely varying structures, as far as 
we can tell at present, wherever they are.
Every scientifically testable form of human uniqueness 
ever alleged has turned out, in the light of present knowl-
edge, to be invalid. Humans are not uniquely social crea-
tures, any more than uniquely tool-making, or language-
using, or self-aware, or –probably– morally conscious. All 
creatures are unique, but human uniqueness is not of a 
unique kind. We differ from other animals only in degree. 
But in this respect, the difference of degree is marked: 
other animals’ cultures are more or less static, whereas 
those of humans are highly mutable, even volatile. The 
first big question for the historian therefore is, why do hu-
man cultures, alone of those of cultural animals, change 
so much? Why are we the only culturally mutable, indeed 
volatile species?
To express the problem another way, it would be otiose to 
attempt to write histories of the societies of any cultural 
creatures except humans. Even chimpanzees, who are in 
just about every respect the creatures most closely com-
parable to humans, hardly have any history. They have 
politics, which the great analyst of chimp political science, 
Frans de Waal, has characterised as machiavellian (Waal, 
1982, 19). But though one alpha male from time to time 
successfully displaces another, the nature of authority in 
chimpanzee communities never changes. It would be rash 
to say that it never could change. One of the most curious 
episodes observed by Jane Goodall’s team of researchers 
in Tanzania was of a chimp low down the ranking among 
the males of his tribe who for a time successfully chal-
lenged the leaders’ dominance by rolling packing cases, 
appropriated from the primatologists’ camp, across his 
rivals’ favoured tracks through the forest. At first, the 
incumbents were inclined to defer to him in their puzzle-
ment; but his coup did not last long and no permanent 
revolution occurred in the distribution of power or in the 
way in which chimpanzee leaders emerge. Nonetheless, it 
is tempting to see in this incident evidence both of how 
limited the range of chimpanzee political culture is com-
pared to that of humans and of how the distance might 
be narrowed in the future (Nishida, 1990; Wrangham, 
1994). We no longer have alpha males running our socie-
ties as, presumably, our hominid ancestors once did. We 
have replaced succession by challenge and combat, which 
still prevails among chimpanzees, with other means of 
selecting leaders, by charisma, sacrality, heredity, sagacity, 
demagogy. But among chimpanzees it is already possible 
for an individual to attain temporary ascendancy by an in-
novative strategy. Over time, new kinds of political change 
could become systematic in chimpanzee societies, as in our 
own. I hope to suggest a little later why this has not yet 
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to have coincided roughly with the holocene, and to have 
quickened spectacularly in the last few centuries.
The need to explain the origins of change and its recent 
and current accelerations is acute precisely because the 
pace of change is so fast today: so fast that even within 
living memory the world seems to have changed unrec-
ognisably, inducing “future shock”, fear, bewilderment and 
resentment. When people do not understand what is hap-
pening to them, the panic. Grandes peurs lash society like 
a flagellant’s scourge. Intellectuals take refuge in “post-
modern” strategies: indifference, anomie, moral relativism 
and scientific indeterminacy, the embrace of chaos, je 
m’enfoutisme. In reaction against uncertainty, electorates 
succumb to noisy little men and glib solutions. Religions 
transmute into dogmatisms and fundamentalisms. We can 
best confront or cope with these reactions if we can pro-
vide a coherent explanation of the rapidity and reach of 
change in our world.
Two ways of documenting –or at least of illustrating or 
evoking the pace of change in our time– appeal to me. 
We can begin by summoning a series of images, so famil-
iar that they need only be mentioned to be visible to the 
mind’s eye, which capture moments of vividly perceived 
change, when the world in which people of my generation 
grew up became unrecognisable. Some of the most potent 
images that form today’s common stock document envi-
ronmental change. No one attentive to world affairs today 
can forget images of the Greenland ice melting into the 
sea, the Amazonian rainforest retreating in flames, new 
viruses inflicting unpredictable plagues upon the world, 
desertification stranding rusting hulks in the salt wastes 
that were once the Aral Sea. These are peculiarly alarming 
images of our time not so much, I think, because of the 
menace they illustrate for the future, though they certainly 
do that, as for the way they make vivid the unprecedented 
nature of change in the recent past. Hitherto, we always 
thought of environmental change as typically slow –much 
slower than cultural change. Now the two realms are so 
thoroughly interpenetrated that the environment seems as 
unstable as every other sphere of human impact.
In politics, images of the fall of the Berlin Wall recall 
the surprise of most of those of us who saw it happen. 
Although some historians and political scientists antici-
pated the soviet system’s collapse (Dallin y Lapidus, 1995), 
happened among chimps, and how circumstances could 
favour it in future.
Meanwhile, we can accept that humans are the only spe-
cies with history. But this form of human distinctiveness 
has accrued over time. It is not “natural” to humans in the 
sense of having been a feature of human life since homo 
sapiens first emerged. On the contrary, as far as we can tell, 
for most of our existence, our species has been culturally 
stable –in key respects, as unchanging as other species. The 
earliest divergences we can attribute to human cultures 
arose as a result of the migration of homo sapiens out of 
our native environment in east Africa, about 100,000 years 
ago. Those divergences were consequences of the need 
to adapt to new and previously unexperienced environ-
ments, which produced, for instance, variants in dress and 
foraging techniques, and of the sheer distances that arose 
between increasingly sundered communities. I suspect that 
separation by distance must have stimulated linguistic 
divergence, which –to judge from the huge differences in 
language today between contiguous peoples in Australia 
and New Guinea, who in other respects resemble each 
other closely in culture– must have been an early form of 
societies’ mutual differentiation. Even so, the differences 
between widely dispersed peoples in the paleolithic era 
was small, by recent standards, and not much greater 
than that of many other primates. All human communities 
practised essentially the same kind of foraging economy. 
All used similar toolkits and weapons. Most seem to have 
practised one or more of a very limited range of religions, 
focussed on shamanism or on the cult of a deity usually 
designated as an “Earth-mother” figure. If art is the mir-
ror of society, the rate of change in paleolithic cultures 
was minimal. The recent discovery of cave paintings at 
Chauvet, some 10,000 years older than previously known 
examples of the genre, reveals startling continuity in sub-
jects, techniques and treatment (Clottes, 2001).
Again, the inescapable inference is that social and cultural 
change is an historical subject, susceptible of historical 
explanation. The peculiar mutability of human society has 
its origins not in “human nature” –whatever that is– but 
in the circumstances of the relatively recent past. The 
increasing pace of change, moreover, is not an inherent 
property of change, but an historical phenomenon. It has 
occurred –for the most part– within a relatively well known 
and relatively well documented period, which can be said 
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the fact that cultures can effect self-transmutations as 
thorough and disturbing, without any outside aid, as the 
changes migrants make. I call to mind the scenes of griev-
ing that the death of the former Princess of Wales, Diana 
Spencer, provoked in England. It suddenly became obvious 
that the England of my youth, to which my father had 
devoted a book (Assia, 1943), the England distinguished 
by reserve and the cult of the stiff upper lip, had vanished, 
not because foreigners corroded the culture, but because 
the English themselves abandoned it (Fernández-Armesto, 
2000). The stiff upper lip went wobbly and Di’s millions 
of mourners wallowed in what the teachers of my child-
hood years would have condemned as exhibitionism and 
emotional slacking.
This is perhaps an extreme case of a culture unrecognisably 
self-transformed but there are many others. I have also 
followed in my own experience the self-transformation 
of Spaniards since the Franco era. Here, of course, the 
political context has changed, but the cultural changes are 
much more thorough than and in some ways independent 
of those of politics, as Spain has abandoned a vocation 
to be “different” and has self-consciously remodelled cul-
tural practices to conform to western European models. 
Spaniards now tolerate pornography, sexual permissive-
ness and divorce. They drink and smoke less. They talk 
their regional languages unselfconsciously. They cross the 
street when they like. Their manners are more relaxed. 
In some parts of the country they have changed the ho-
rarium of the working day. They dress casually –at least, 
more casually than before (Hooper, 2003; Tremlett, 2006). 
Even in countries which have become exporters of labour, 
cultural “westernisation” has had similar effects. Changes 
in sexual mores are particularly unsettling because they 
coincide with generation gaps, challenge family solidar-
ity, and have something of the force of violated taboos. 
In parts of the West, the rapidity with which homosexual 
alliances have achieved equality or near-equality of es-
teem with traditional marriage amounts, in effect, to a 
new morality. In general, the effects of pluralism, which 
are, I think, inestimably beneficial, are also unsettling. I 
think of the widely reproduced photographs of the pope 
at prayer in Aya Sophia. Catholics of my generation could 
hardly behold such images without thinking that the world 
they now inhabit is very different from the one in which 
they were catechised. Even a young Rip van Winkle would 
awake today, after a short nap, to a surprising world and a 
people overestimated its durability. Almost everyone who 
witnessed the events of 1989-92 in central and eastern 
Europe was astounded at the scale and suddenness of the 
end of the Cold War, and the dismantling of a structure 
which –for all its menace– conveyed the comfort of fa-
miliarity and, according to the consensus of the experts, 
preserved the peace of the world. Most people, I suspect, 
would select the 9/11 felling of the World Trade Center in 
New York as another such moment, which reconfigured 
world politics along with the skyline of the city. The ef-
fects of the event have certainly been far-reaching. They 
contributed to the onset of a new, aggressive era in US 
foreign policy and to the forfeiture or long postponement 
of the world’s opportunity to create a new order, based on 
international co-operation and global governance, after 
the end of the Cold War. But for me the images of de-
struction and corruption generated by the Iraq War are far 
more disturbing because they disclose a world I –with all 
my scepticism and world-weariness– had never previously 
detected or foreseen. I had naively believed that one of the 
great merits of democracies is that it is hard to coax them 
into war, and that they therefore tended to make the world 
a better and safer place. The Iraq imbroglio has shown us 
how easy it is for irresponsible governments to start wars 
even in democracies.
Images like these from the political arena are matched 
by others from the world of economics: images of panic 
in the bourses and people on the streets, whenever the 
frightening lurches typical of modern economies fell cur-
rencies, break banks, bust businesses and slash stocks. On 
the whole, however, although these pressures generate 
far-reaching psychological strains and contribute to the 
neuroses and psychoses of modern life, I think it is fair 
to say that economies are surprisingly resilient. Cultural 
changes, on the other hand, are much harder for soci-
ety to cope with because when they are deep, rapid and 
extensive they subvert people’s identities and challenge 
their sense of their place in the world. The current scale 
of global migration, and its effects on countries with net 
intakes of migrants, is a prime example. I welcome its 
enriching effects, but can understand why many people 
find it disturbing to see their neighbourhoods or even their 
hometowns changed –the look of buildings and gardens 
transformed, the shops restocked, the sound of the streets 
retuned, the places of worship re-dedicated, the aroma of 
the food revised. More surprising and more shocking is 
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change is cumulative –which is no explanation, but mere-
ly an alternative way of describing the phenomenon we 
have to explain. It is tempting to look for an explanation 
to the two influences that have proved most reliable in 
explaining other kinds of change and all behaviourial 
change –including change properly classified as cultural– 
in non-human species: evolution and environment2. But 
neither of these is satisfactory in accounting for the fre-
quency and volatility of short-term cultural change in 
humans. The critical gap between human and non-human 
cultural species demands a further, peculiarly human ex-
planation. The environment, in any case, is relatively inert, 
compared with human culture, and although there are 
occasional cases, such as large-scale volcanic eruptions 
or the sudden evolution of a new and powerful microor-
ganism, when the rhythms of environmental and cultural 
change coincide, these are too infrequent to account for 
all the lurches of culture. Evolution, too, seems generally 
too slow-working a mechanism to meet the case. Even 
the syncopations of “punctuated equilibrium” are too slow 
and too rare. We can measure the pace of human evolu-
tionary divergence in our DNA: the results do not stand 
comparison with the cultural divergence historians record. 
Although our species encompasses a relatively wide range 
of DNA, the variation is infinitesimal, compared with the 
enormous diversity of our cultures. The only serious at-
tempt to explain cultural change in evolutionary terms 
–the theory of memes– is valueless, not only because 
there is no evidence for the existence of memes, in the 
sense of evolved “units” of culture, or of any mechanism 
by which evolution could select them for transmission to 
other cultures, but also because such evidence as we have 
supports an incompatible conclusion: the most adaptive 
cultures are not the fittest for survival, but the most 
prone to catastrophe (Dawkins, 1976). Successful survival 
cannot therefore account for the replication of memes. A 
system which, independently of human choice, imposed 
cultures equipped to survive would select for foraging. 
Cultures which have stuck to that strategy have survived 
for scores of millennia, whereas those that have substi-
tuted sedentarism, urbanisation, agriculture, and all the 
other adaptations we associate with “civilisation” are one 
with Nineveh and Tyre. Our adaptations bear the finger-
prints of free will precisely because, so far, just about all of 
them have been unsuccessful (Fernández-Armesto, 2001). 
Their increasing pace looks like a measure of increasing 
desperation.
dislocating experience. The plus ça change adage no longer 
applies: if I can be excused a necessarily paradoxical way 
of putting it, things can change so much that they are no 
longer their former selves.
My second way of evoking the pace of contemporary 
change is to refer to its effect on historians. Historical 
writing narrates the past but reflects the present. In my 
time in the profession, the most conspicuous change has 
been what I call the collapse of the longue durée. When I 
was a student, gradualism was the vogue. My contempo-
raries and I were taught to see the origins of changes in 
the grinding structures of competing kinds of determin-
ism. Now it is accepted that great events can arise from 
small causes and that everything can be explained or is 
even best explained in its immediate context, or, so to 
say, that history as a system resembles the weather, in 
which the flap of a butterfly’s wings can raise a storm 
(Howard, 1984). When we seek to explain the decline and 
fall of the Roman Empire, for instance, we do not return, 
like Gibbon, to the Antonine age, when the empire was 
doing rather well, but confine ourselves to the circum-
stances of the barbarian invasions of the late fourth and 
fifth centuries. When we want to understand the English 
Civil War, we no longer appeal, as Macaulay did, to “the 
Whig interpretation” or to supposed long continuities of 
England’s traditions of freedom, stretching back to the 
Germanic woods, much less to the rise of the bourgeoisie, 
but concentrate on the few years preceding the outbreak 
of hostilities and on the effects of the Scottish war of 
1638. When we explore the causes of the French Revolu-
tion, we no longer reach back, as Tocqueville did, to the 
era of Louis XIV, but allege a relatively brief crisis that 
began with the American Revolutionary War. When we 
discuss the origins of the First World War, we no longer 
do as Alberti did, and cite the defects of the nineteenth-
century diplomatic system, which actually kept the peace, 
but look at the breakdown of that system in the years 
preceding the war, or even, in an extreme case, at the 
impetus of the railway timetables of August, 1914. And 
so on. The examples are innumerable. In other words, as 
the pace of change in our own times has increased, the 
willingness of historians to believe in long continuities in 
the past has declined.
As far as I know, no explanation for the increasing pace 
of change is available, other than the assumption that 
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communities have taken this step and have embraced the 
ecology of hunters, I think it is unfanciful to speculate 
that their trajectory of change could eventually draw 
closer to ours, as hunting becomes more important in 
their economies, evolution responds accordingly, and 
chimps get ever more imaginative.
However that may be, the link between ideas and cultural 
change is unproblematic. We observe our world. We imag-
ine it differently. We work to realise our imagined world. 
But this still leaves the increasing pace of cultural change 
unexplained. If I am right so far, ideas need to multiply in 
order for cultural change to accelerate. The best attested 
reason for the multiplication of ideas is the fertilising ef-
fect of exchange. Ideas multiply as the result of dialogue. 
That is why we are here, talking to one another. Cultures 
change, in part, at least, because unfamiliar ideas about 
how to do things impinge from outside. For example, the 
work of Jared Diamond has made familiar the notion that 
Eurasia has been an arena of faster change than other 
parts of the world because its geography favours intense 
exchanges of culture between its indigenous civilisations 
(Diamond, 1997, 354-75). Isolation retards change, ex-
change stimulates it. As Diamond points out, New Guinea 
has a history of farming and sedentary life at least as long-
standing as those of other Asian civilisations, and probably 
longer than those of Africa, Europe and the Americas, but 
isolation slowed or checked subsequent development. We 
can represent the world-wide difference in the mutual 
accessibility of civilisations diagrammatically:
We can at least be confident in asserting that although 
evolution and the environment create the framework of 
contingencies within which everything in history hap-
pens, and that some features of cultures may be expli-
cable in evolutionary and environmental terms, specific 
cultural changes do happen independently of evolution 
and environment. For culture as a projection of the hu-
man mind, and cultural changes originate in the realm of 
ideas. I do not mean to assert that the mind –or, to focus 
on exactly what I mean by “mind” in the present con-
text, the capacity for generating ideas– is unaffected by 
evolution. As far as we can tell, our capacity for thought 
is itself a product of evolution, and if it is true –as we 
suppose, on the basis of our present knowledge– that hu-
mans have an exceptional capacity for generating ideas, 
evolution should have played some part in endowing us 
with it. As a working hypothesis, I propose that ideas are 
a by-product of a well equipped imagination, which in 
turn is a product of a well developed power of anticipa-
tion. Evolution selects for anticipation especially in the 
case of hunting animals, who need to be able to antici-
pate the behaviour both of prey and of rival predators, 
often in environments which occlude the senses. Homo 
sapiens needs a relatively rich imagination to make up 
for the feebleness of body, slowness of gait and weakness 
of sight and smell that disadvantage us as hunters. This, 
I suspect, is why humans have so many more ideas than 
other primates, who resemble us so closely in so many 
other respects, but who rarely or never eat meat and 
who typically do not go hunting. Now that chimpanzee 
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have reverted to a form of isolation more extreme than any 
our ancestors experienced. We shall be alone in the uni-
verse, with no other cultures –except those of putative be-
ings in other galaxies– with which to communicate. There 
will be no inter-cultural exchange to spawn other kinds of 
innovation. In the meantime, however, we shall continue 
to live in “interesting times” and suffer the corresponding 
curse. We have to find ways of living at ease in a disturb-
ingly alchemical world of rapid, total transmutations of 
culture. In particular, we have to be on our guard against 
the forms of political and religious extremism that thrive in 
revolutionary circumstances. One strategy is to emphasise 
that there are still continuities to cling to, and that some 
features of tradition can endure even hectic change. Jer-
emy Black remarked that change is now so pervasive that 
we should be more surprised that any continuities survive, 
rather than that the transformations we observe are so 
sweeping. In part, I suspect, those continuities remain pos-
sible as a paradoxical effect of change. For change tends to 
increase complexity. Indeed, change is inseparable from and 
multiplies the connective elements in the system: the world 
of today is connected by innumerable links between its daz-
zlingly varied elements. In some instances, complex systems 
are highly fragile, because their parts are interdependent, 
and failure in one area can cause total arrest; but in general 
they tend to be surprisingly robust, especially if they are 
undesigned, with far more links than are strictly necessary, 
because some links can perish without jeopardising the 
continuity of functions. That is the kind of system we live 
in now. Its lurches are disturbing, but it also conveys a kind 
of comfort. For its very momentum, its very mutability, are 
becoming its increasingly familiar features. If they were to 
cease that change –the last change– would be the most 
unsettling of all.
This helps us understand why for so much of the human 
past, cultural change was so slow –barely exceeding, as 
we have seen– the rate of change in other cultural spe-
cies. The story of our past has been, for most of the time, 
one of divergence, as human communities migrated across 
the globe and in many cases lost touch with one another. 
Such cultural changes as occurred during the period of 
divergence are largely explicable in terms of adaptations 
to the different environments human migrants encoun-
tered. Subsequently, at first very gradually or fitfully, as 
sundered communities re-established contact, ideas oscil-
lated with increasing frequency across newly established 
frontiers, generating or contributing to the generation of 
accelerating change (Fernández-Armesto, 2006). Among 
the changes were projects for extending the reach of ex-
ploration and exchange, and technologies to effect them: 
striking examples of reimaginings of the world, realised in 
practice. The beginning of a new, and so far relatively short 
period of convergence therefore coincided with a quicken-
ing of change of all kinds. The most marked feature of the 
very recent past –which we call globalisation– is, from 
one point of view, intensified exchange. To put it crudely: 
change grows out of exchange. The more exchange, the 
more change. Intercultural contacts do not just re-shake 
the kaleidoscope of the world; they also multiply the crys-
tals it contains.
Is the quickening of the pace of change limitless? Histo-
rians properly base their predictions of the future on the 
experience of the past and tend to be surprised when the 
normalcy of the world fails to restore itself. If my train of 
thought is valid so far, we should expect change to slow 
and even cease. If we ever achieve a truly globalised world, 
in which we share a common, globalised culture, we shall 
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NOTES
1  Modern philosophy seems to have 
concentrated entirely on how we 
experience change (Bergson, 1946), 
how we define it (Davidson, 1980) or 
whether it can be said to constitute 
process (Whitehead, 1929).
2  For a representative array of attempts 
see Pomper 2003.
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